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While the Bank of Canada’s inflation-targeting regime has proven 
remarkably successful, the recent financial crisis highlighted the fact 
that low inflation may not be enough to ensure the stability of 
the financial system and the economy in general.  The goal of achieving 
and maintaining financial stability has become, in Canada 
and elsewhere, the next frontier of monetary policy.
Christopher RaganAbout The 
Author
Christopher Ragan 
is an Associate Professor  
of Economics at McGill  
University and holds the  
David Dodge Chair in  






C.D. Howe Institute publications undergo rigorous external review  
by academics and independent experts drawn from the public and 
private sectors.
The Institute’s peer review process ensures the quality, integrity and 
objectivity of its policy research. The Institute will not publish any 
study that, in its view, fails to meet the standards of the review process. 
The Institute requires that its authors publicly disclose any actual or 
potential conflicts of interest of which they are aware.
In its mission to educate and foster debate on essential public policy 
issues, the C.D. Howe Institute provides nonpartisan policy advice 
to interested parties on a non-exclusive basis. The Institute will not 
endorse any political party, elected official, candidate for elected office, 
or interest group. 
As a registered Canadian charity, the C.D. Howe Institute as a matter 
of course accepts donations from individuals, private and public 
organizations, charitable foundations and others, by way of general 
and project support. The Institute will not accept any donation that 
stipulates a predetermined result or policy stance or otherwise inhibits 
its independence, or that of its staff and authors, in pursuing scholarly 
activities or disseminating research results.






The Institute’s Commitment to Quality
Commentary No. 338
 January 2012
Monetary Policy The Study In Brief
The monetary policy arrangement in Canada has proven very successful. Despite many and varied economic 
shocks, the Bank of Canada has established the necessary conditions under which the annual rate of inflation, 
as measured by the rate of change of the Consumer Price Index, has remained very close to its formal   
2 percent target for more than 15 years. 
The recent financial crisis, however, has highlighted the fact that low inflation may not be enough to ensure 
the stability of the financial system and the economy in general. The goal of achieving and maintaining 
financial stability has become, in Canada and elsewhere, the next frontier of monetary policy.
What is needed is a new Canadian institutional framework to oversee macro-prudential regulation, which 
would take a systemic approach to safeguarding the financial system as a whole, and clearly define the role 
of the Bank of Canada within it.  It will require the federal government, first, to recognize the importance 
of the issue and, second, to take the necessary time to assemble the framework with the appropriate parties 
involved and to assign responsibilities clearly. Doing it right will involve bringing together various policy 
authorities with different perspectives, specialties, and primary mandates. 
This Commentary provides the following recommendations for a more effective structure for macro-
prudential oversight and policy coordination in Canada:
•	 The	maintenance	of	financial	stability	in	Canada	should	be	added	to	the	mandate	of	the	existing	Senior	
Advisory Committee, which brings together various departments and agencies. 
•	 SAC	should	become	a	legislated	committee	whose	formal	minutes	should	be	sent	to	the	minister	of	finance.	
Its membership should be expanded to include the CMHC (or perhaps its financial arm) and, if one is 
created, a national securities regulator.
•	 The	federal	government	should	ensure	that	all	SAC	members	have	the	appropriate	resources	to	enable	them	
to understand more fully aspects of the financial system that are beyond their direct concern.
•	 The	Bank	of	Canada	should	take	a	clear	intellectual	leadership	role	within	SAC,	and	the	governor	of	the	
Bank and the deputy minister of finance should co-chair the committee.
•	 The	co-chairs	should	make	clear	policy	recommendations	directly	to	the	minister	of	finance,	who	would	be	
ultimately responsible for all policy decisions.
The successful evolution of Canadian monetary policy is not just a reflection of the success or failure of 
random policy developments. From the mid-1970s onward, policymakers at the Bank of Canada have 
sought continually to make genuine policy improvements. In like manner, with regard to macro-prudential 
oversight, the federal government needs to search continually for policy improvements to ensure that we 
have a strong and stable financial system.
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary© is a periodic analysis of, and commentary on, current public policy issues.  Barry Norris 
and James Fleming edited the manuscript; Yang Zhao prepared it for publication. As with all Institute publications, the 
views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Institute’s members or Board 
of Directors. Quotation with appropriate credit is permissible.
To	order	this	publication	please	contact:	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute,	67	Yonge	St.,	Suite	300,	Toronto,	Ontario	M5E	1J8.	The	
full text of this publication is also available on the Institute’s website at www.cdhowe.org.2
One	measure	of	the	success	of	Canadian	monetary	
policy is that, despite the existence of many and 
varied economic shocks, the annual rate of inflation 
of the Consumer Price Index has remained very 
close to the Bank’s formal 2 percent target since 
1995, and measures of expected inflation over the 
past 15 years have rarely deviated far or for long 
from this target. A related but less formal measure 
of success is that discussions of monetary policy 
and inflation, at least until a few years ago, were 
considerably more “boring” than they were back in 
the	late	1970s	and	early	1980s	—	a	time	when	very	
high and volatile inflation was a headline issue for 
the public and a major preoccupation for Canada’s 
macro policymakers, both inside and outside the 
Bank of Canada. 
With the arrival of the global financial crisis in 
2008	and	the	major	recession	that	followed	in	its	
wake, monetary policy returned to centre stage, 
where it has been anything but boring. In addition 
to responding to the recessionary forces with large 
and sustained reductions in policy interest rates, 
central banks in Canada and elsewhere developed 
creative ways to provide much-needed liquidity 
to financial markets and have also been exploring 
how best to contribute to ensuring the resilience 
and stability of the overall financial system. Across 
the developed world, the goal of achieving and 
maintaining “financial stability” has become the  
new frontier in monetary policy.
The purpose of this Commentary is to examine 
this new challenge for Canadian policymakers. I 
begin with a brief review of the considerable success 
of Canadian monetary policy since the adoption 
of inflation targeting in 1991. I then examine the 
issue of financial stability, with emphasis on two 
aspects of the problem: conducting monetary policy 
to “lean” against emerging financial excesses, which, 
if feasible, is clearly the responsibility of the Bank 
of Canada; and designing a system of governance 
to ensure effective “macro-prudential” oversight of 
the entire financial system, which is the ultimate 
responsibility of the federal government. The Bank 
is currently exploring whether and how best to lean 
against financial excesses (Boivin, Lane, and Meh 
2010).	On	the	issue	of	governance,	however,	it	is	
not evident that the federal government is exploring 
the issue thoroughly. I conclude the Commentary 
by arguing that, in order to have effective macro-
prudential oversight and policy coordination, the 
federal government needs to design a system in 
which the Bank of Canada plays a clear leadership 
role but in which accountability for policy decisions 
ultimately rests with the minister of finance.
Twenty Years of Inflation 
Targeting
After several decades of experience, many shocks 
from various sources, and plenty of learning about 
  I would like to thank John Crow, Peter Howitt, Paul Jenkins, David Laidler, David Longworth, Angelo Melino, Gordon Thiessen 
and Finn Poschmann for many helpful comments and suggestions. I alone am responsible for any remaining errors.
Monetary policy in Canada has evolved significantly over the 
past few decades. Important changes have occurred in the Bank 
of Canada’s explicit objective, its specific operating procedures, 
and its approaches to communication with both the public and  
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what works and what does not, central banks in 
Canada and many other developed countries had 
converged	by	the	late	1980s	on	some	solid	guiding	
principles for monetary policy. These can be  
boiled down to two key observations regarding  
how economies function and how monetary  
policy operates.
First, there is now a clear recognition that 
high	and	variable	inflation	is	costly	—	not	only	
for individual households and firms but also for 
the smooth operation of the economy. Not all of 
these costs are easy to measure or even to quantify 
in simple theoretical macro models, but they 
are nonetheless real, and come largely from the 
uncertainty that high and unstable inflation injects 
into the workings of the price system.1	Second,	
there is an equally clear acknowledgment that the 
rate of inflation is the single macro variable that 
monetary policy is able to influence in a systematic 
manner over the long run. Actions taken by central 
banks can and do influence a whole range of real 
and nominal variables over the course of a typical 
business	cycle,	but	a	key	insight	—	argued	most	
influentially	by	Milton	Friedman	(1968)	—	is	
that these short-run effects typically unwind over 
the longer run, leaving the permanent effects of 
monetary policy to fall solely on the level or growth 
rates of nominal variables.
Given these two underlying principles, it is 
perhaps not surprising that, in many countries, 
monetary policy evolved to the point where central 
banks now explicitly target a low rate of inflation. 
After all, if high inflation is costly and inflation is 
the one variable that a central bank can hope to 
control over the longer run, it makes little sense 
to target anything else. In 1991, Canada was the 
second country (after New Zealand) formally to 
adopt inflation targeting; since then, many other 
countries have followed suit. In retrospect, this 
evolution of monetary policy toward inflation 
targeting might seem obvious or inevitable, but it 
would not have happened without the shocks and 
policy mistakes and learning that occurred over the 
previous	30	years	(Ragan	2011).
There have been many excellent reviews and 
evaluations of Canadian monetary policy since 
the early 1990s (see, for example, Crow 2009b; 
and	Laidler	and	Robson	1994,	2004),	so	a	detailed	
treatment is unnecessary here. But few deny that it 
has been a considerable success. In a comprehensive 
review of the relationship between inflation and 
many	macroeconomic	variables	—	including	the	
dispersion of relative prices, inflation expectations, 
and	output	volatility	—	Longworth	(2002)	shows	
that the reduction of inflation and the adoption of 
inflation targeting appear to have coincided with 
a general reduction in economic volatility and an 
improvement in broad measures of performance.2 
As for the achievement of its stated objective, the 
Bank of Canada certainly delivered on its principal 
commitment: the formal inflation target has been 
2 percent since 1995, and from then until 2007 the 
average rate of inflation was remarkably close to 
the target, though there were brief periods when 
inflation strayed noticeably.
The past 20 years have also seen a notable 
evolution regarding the implementation and 
communication of Canadian monetary policy. 
Perhaps the most visible changes have been an 
emphasis on the Bank of Canada’s target for the 
overnight interest rate as its primary instrument, the 
establishment of eight fixed announcement dates 
per year, the regular publication of the Monetary 
Policy Report, and an increase in the number and 
1	 A	partial	review	of	the	various	costs	of	inflation	and	benefits	of	disinflation	is	found	in	Ragan	(1998).	
2	 Some	debate	remains	regarding	the	appropriate	stance	of	Canadian	monetary	policy	during	the	mid-1990s.	For	an	example	
of the view that monetary policy was systematically too tight in this period, see Fortin (1996); a response from the Bank of 
Canada	is	Freedman	and	Macklem	(1998).	4
clarity of public speeches by Bank officials. The 
Bank’s communications are now aimed not just at 
explaining what it is doing and why, but also at the 
need to keep inflationary expectations anchored to 
the inflation target.
If a well-functioning policy regime developed to 
maturity between 1991 and 2007, events since then 
have revealed the resilience of this regime. When 
the global financial system began to show  its strains 
in the summer of 2007, which eventually revealed 
deep and systemic problems, the Bank of Canada 
was	able	to	respond	effectively	—	by	increasing	
the liquidity available to financial institutions, thus 
reducing fears of counterparty risk and maintaining 
the	flow	of	credit	—	while	maintaining	its	credible	
commitment to its inflation target.
By	the	fall	of	2008	global	financial	markets	
were	in	full	crisis.	Even	though	Canada	was	far	
from the epicentre of the crisis, the globalization 
of financial markets guaranteed that Canada would 
experience significant tremors. Canadians’ well-
anchored inflation expectations, together with the 
Bank of Canada’s long-established credibility in 
returning inflation to target, permitted the central 
bank to respond aggressively by sharply cutting its 
target for the overnight interest rate. By the spring 
of 2009, with its policy rate at its effective lower 
bound, the Bank was on the verge of implementing 
quantitative easing and perhaps even credit easing 
—	whereby	the	Bank	would	purchase	assets	directly	
in financial markets without changing its target 
for	the	overnight	interest	rate.	The	US	Federal	
Reserve	and	the	Bank	of	England	had	already	taken	
these steps, but the economic situation in Canada 
was then less dire. Though the Bank of Canada 
explained these policies in its April 2009 Monetary 
Policy Report, they were never implemented. 
Instead, it tried something less dramatic, but no 
less innovative: it issued a commitment to hold its 
policy rate at the effective lower bound until the 
summer of 2010, conditional on the outlook for 
inflation. The payoff appeared almost immediately 
in the form of a reduction in long-term interest 
rates (He 2010).
Looking back over the past 20 years, it is 
difficult not to be impressed with the conduct 
and achievements of Canadian monetary policy. 
Confronted with many shocks from various sources, 
the Bank of Canada has upheld its commitment to 
keep	inflation	low	and	stable.	Even	the	dramatic	
events of the past few years revealed no substantive 
deficiencies in the Bank’s analytical abilities or 
operating procedures. This success surely played 
a leading role in the recent decision by the Bank 
and the federal government to renew the inflation-
targeting agreement in its current form for another 
five years.
As Laidler (1999) emphasizes, any “coherent 
monetary order” must have four elements: a 
well-defined goal; the power and ability of the 
relevant authorities to achieve that goal; an 
understanding of the goal by private-sector agents 
and the expectation that it will be achieved; and 
accountability of the relevant authorities to the 
electorate for both the choice of goal and their 
performance in achieving it. By this standard, 
Canada’s monetary order is clearly coherent. The 
Bank of Canada and the federal government have 
agreed upon a well-defined target for inflation; the 
Bank has the power and the tools to keep inflation 
close to the target rate; the Bank’s inflation target is 
well known and constantly repeated in the Bank’s 
communications, and private-sector inflation 
expectations are well anchored to the target; and 
the Bank is accountable for its actions and for the 
resulting	rate	of	inflation	—	through	the	minister	of	
finance	and	Parliament	—	to	the	Canadian	people.
Financial Stability Is the  
Next Frontier
Now, however, the Bank of Canada faces two 
policy	challenges.	One	is	an	immediate	challenge	
stemming from current conditions in the Canadian 
and global economies that it can address with its 
current collection of policy tools. The second, longer 5 Commentary 338
term in nature, and less openly discussed, will require 
new policy tools, and is arguably more important 
for the collective well-being of Canadians.
The Bank’s immediate challenge is to determine 
the appropriate policy route back to “normal” from 
the	highly	abnormal	events	of	the	2008/09	global	
financial crisis and recession. But several factors 
complicate this path. There is growing recognition 
that economic recovery following a major financial 
crisis involves the combination of a fragile 
banking sector and the striving of households and 
businesses to reduce their debt loads. As a result, 
such a recovery tends to be more protracted than 
a recovery that does not follow a financial crisis 
(Reinhart	and	Reinhart	2010).	The	transmission	
mechanism of monetary policy is likely to be altered 
by these special conditions, making it more difficult 
to determine the policy route back to normality. 
In addition, the Bank must pay close attention to 
economic conditions beyond Canada’s borders. 
In	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom,	
significant excess capacity, highly expansionary 
monetary policy, and the beginnings of large fiscal 
consolidations could combine with global trends 
in energy and food prices to produce a dangerous 
mix	of	inflation	and	stagnation.	In	Europe,	high	
and fast-growing public debt, legitimately skeptical 
global investors, and the inherent restrictions of 
a common currency have combined to threaten 
the	political	foundations	of	the	European	Union	
and could well lead to a financial crisis in the 
near future. The policy path forward, including 
the	role	to	be	played	by	the	European	Central	
Bank, remains very unclear. Thus, over the coming 
months, the Bank of Canada will face the difficult 
challenge of balancing the need for higher 
policy interest rates to offset emerging domestic 
inflationary pressures and the need to keep interest 
rates low while heightened economic and financial 
uncertainty abroad continues to hinder domestic 
confidence, investment, and exports.
The second, and less familiar, challenge for 
Canadian monetary policy is broader in scope and 
potentially far more important to Canadians’ future 
well-being: the pursuit and maintenance of financial 
stability.	The	nature	of	the	2008/09	global	financial	
crisis, with problems in one part of the financial 
system quickly creating problems in other parts, 
led to the widespread recognition of the need to 
place more emphasis on both the interconnected 
nature of financial institutions and the procyclical 
nature of the financial system. Although there is no 
single precise and universally accepted definition 
of financial stability (Borio and Drehmann 2009b), 
the financial system needs to be sufficiently 
resilient to absorb shocks large enough to cause the 
failure of a small number of financial institutions 
(Freedman and Goodlet 2007). Put differently, 
financial stability exists when even large shocks to 
the financial sector are insufficient to cause changes 
in interest rates and credit flows large enough to 
generate significant macroeconomic effects.
The pursuit of financial stability involves central 
banks in two direct ways: through their “leaning” 
against emerging financial excesses, and through 
“macro-prudential” regulation and oversight of the 
financial system.
“Leaning” Against Financial Excesses
There is a growing consensus that the cause of the 
2008/09	financial	crisis	was	a	complex	combination	
of many practices, policies, and institutional 
arrangements, most of which were deep within the 
financial	system.	Laidler	and	Banerjee	(2008)	and	
White (2009) argue convincingly that an important 
part of the problem was that, in the several years 
prior to the crisis, central banks in many countries 
—	including	Canada	—	were	too	unwilling	to	“lean”	
against growing financial excesses, such as large 
increases in financial leverage in the household, 
corporate, and banking sectors. Instead, the central 
banks’ implicit preference was to “clean up” whatever 
mess was created by eventual financial collapse.
White (2009) argues sensibly, however, that 
“leaning” should not be thought of as the Bank of 6
Canada’s making its interest rate decisions with the 
objective of formally targeting a set of asset prices. 
Not only would it be unclear which small set of 
prices to target; it would also be unclear how to 
identify any given price increase as inappropriate 
or somehow disconnected from the underlying 
fundamentals.	Rather,	White’s	concept	of	leaning	
is far less formulaic and more subtle than formal 
targeting would ever permit: if the Bank chose 
to lean against financial excesses, it should look 
broadly at financial markets and use its discretion 
and judgment carefully, casting its eye over levels of 
asset prices and financial leverage that are deviating 
from their long-run trends, and examining the 
growth rates of monetary aggregates and credit 




crises through history have been preceded by the 
development of financial excesses, and a valuable 
guiding principle for policy is that careful but 
significant preemptive policy tightening is more 
effective than the massive and sudden monetary 
expansion that typically follows a financial crisis. 
The economic and financial events of the past 
few years have made the arguments in favour of 
leaning against financial excess less controversial 
than they were during the relatively prosperous 
times of the early and mid-2000s. For example, 
it is difficult to imagine a macroeconomist today 
arguing	that	US	monetary	policy	was	“just	right”	
in 2005, and that––with the full knowledge of how 
the	next	few	years	transpired—we	would	not	have	
been willing to accept slightly lower inflation and 
economic growth during that period in return for a 
lower probability of a subsequent financial crisis.3
Real	world	policy	actions,	however,	must	be	
made without such knowledge, and an important 
issue in the “lean versus clean” debate remains 
unresolved: what should a central bank do when 
different macroeconomic indicators are suggesting 
different policy actions? For example, suppose that 
the many usual indicators reviewed in the pursuit 
of price stability suggest there is little threat of 
higher inflation in the near future; in this case, the 
likely policy action by the central bank would be to 
leave	its	policy	interest	rate	unchanged.	Suppose,	
however, that some selection of indicators relevant 
to the pursuit of financial stability suggests an 
unhealthy build-up of financial excesses, thus 
indicating a need to lean by increasing the policy 
interest	rate.	Should	monetary	policy	be	driven	
by the concern to maintain financial stability, 
even though that might mean deviating from the 
inflation target, or should it focus on the inflation 
target and let the financial excesses follow their own 
path?	Since	a	central	bank	has	but	one	instrument,	
and sustained inflation appears to be determined 
fundamentally by monetary policy, the possible 
divergence of these two sets of indicators suggests 
the need for additional policy instruments.
Recent	research	at	the	Bank	of	Canada	sheds	
light on this issue and also emphasizes the 
centrality of the potential difference in scope 
between monetary policy and financial excess. 
Boivin, Lane, and Meh (2010) develop model 
simulations in which the best policy response to 
sector-specific financial excesses might be well-
directed regulatory tools rather than monetary 
tightening. For example, an unusually large and 
sustained increase in real estate prices might be best 
addressed with a change in mortgage or mortgage-
insurance regulations rather than with traditional 
monetary tightening. The problem with the latter is 
that it applies more-or-less uniformly to the entire 
economy and, if the financial excesses are narrow 
enough, the monetary tightening might make it 
3	 Few	analyses	of	history’s	recurring	pattern	of	financial	excess	and	collapse	are	more	readable	than	those	of	Galbraith	(1994)	
and	Kindleberger	and	Aliber	(2005).	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	(2009)	offer	a	more	modern	and	technical	treatment.7 Commentary 338
more difficult for the central bank to achieve its 
objectives	regarding	price	stability.	On	the	other	
hand, financial excesses that exist simultaneously 
in several sectors of the economy or that can easily 
spill over from one sector to others might be best 
addressed with a combination of regulations and 
monetary tightening and, in this case, the central 
bank’s actions (together with the regulations) might 
be consistent with enhancing both financial stability 
and price stability. The key policy question for the 
central bank then becomes whether the existing 
financial excesses are large enough and widespread 
enough to warrant monetary policy action. This line 
of inquiry and these preliminary findings support 
Carney’s (2009) argument that even well-designed 
leaning by a central bank is unlikely to be sufficient, 
and that the country’s first line of defence for 
ensuring financial stability should be reliance on an 
effective framework of financial market oversight 
and regulation designed to dampen or offset the 
effects of significant financial excesses. To the extent 
that such an effective policy framework exists, the 
central bank will have greater ability to focus the 
use of its conventional policy tool on the delivery of 
price stability. This view is also carefully explained 
in the background information on the most recent 
renewal of Canada’s inflation-control target (Bank 
of	Canada	2011,	section	4).	This	brings	us	to	the	
second aspect of ensuring financial stability.
Better “Macro-Prudential” Regulation  
and Oversight
The interconnectedness of financial institutions 
means that policymakers need to pay as much 
attention to the stability of the overall financial 
system as they regularly pay to the stability of 
individual institutions within that system. “Micro-
prudential regulation” is directed at ensuring the 
prudent behaviour of individual institutions and 
protecting	their	depositors	—	both	while	taking	
the external environment as more-or-less given. 
Examples	of	such	regulation	include	setting	
appropriate loan-loss provisions and reserve and 
capital requirements, determining upper limits on 
financial institutions’ leverage, and establishing 
maximum loan-to-value ratios for residential 
mortgages. 
“Macro-prudential regulation,” in contrast, 
is aimed at guarding against systemic risks and 
ensuring the overall stability of the financial system. 
It recognizes not only the kinds of shocks that 
might occur to the overall financial system and from 
what sources, but also how the behaviour or collapse 
of one institution can influence other institutions 
and,	eventually,	the	financial	system.	Spillovers	and	
positive feedback loops, and thus the potential for 
systemic instability, are key themes in the macro-
prudential mindset (International Monetary Fund 
2011; Longworth 2011). 
While micro-prudential regulation and 
methods of oversight are well developed in many 
industrialized countries, the long period of relative 
financial	stability	following	the	Second	World	
War probably explains why macro-prudential 
regulation and oversight were largely ignored, or at 
least received much less emphasis. A recent Bank 
of	England	paper	on	the	role	of	macro-prudential	
policy	in	the	United	Kingdom	contains	a	statement	
that applies equally to many economies:
Macro-prudential policy is a missing ingredient 
from the current policy framework. In the past few 
decades, there has been too great a gap between 
macroeconomic policy and the regulation of 
individual financial institutions. If macro-prudential 
policy had been able to increase the resilience of the 
system and to moderate exuberance in the supply of 
credit to the economy, and especially to the financial 
system, the crisis would have been less costly.  
(2009,	3.)
The procyclicality of credit and leverage that is a 
natural	aspect	of	the	economic	cycle	(Fisher	1933,	
Borio	and	White	2004,	Geanakoplos	2010)	leads	
macro-prudential regulation to focus on the role 
of countercyclical policy tools, which typically are 
time-varying versions of existing micro-prudential 
tools.	Examples	include	the	requirement	that	either	8
minimum ratios of bank capital (to risk-adjusted 
assets) rise or leverage restrictions become tighter 
during the upswing of the credit cycle or that, 
under the same conditions, limits on loan-to-
value ratios for home mortgages become tighter. 
A key challenge when using such countercyclical 
regulations is to determine the appropriate time or 
conditions for implementing a specific requirement. 
For example, at what precise stage in the credit 
cycle should capital requirements be raised and 
by how much? And what is the tradeoff between 
raising capital requirements and reducing the 
maximum	loan-to-value	ratio?	Such	questions	
might not yet have clear answers, though central 
banks and finance ministries in many countries are 
now examining them directly. 
Given the globalized nature of financial 
markets, the drive for better macro-prudential 
regulation understandably has taken place with a 
great	deal	of	international	coordination	—	both	
necessary and desirable to ensure that regulations 
do not inappropriately distort activity across 
countries. Central banks, including the Bank of 
Canada, are actively involved in these discussions 




regarding appropriate levels of liquidity and bank 
capital have recently been accepted by the G20 
countries and are expected to be implemented in 
the near future.4
The Need for National Institutions
Once	better	macro-prudential	regulations	are	
designed and passed into law, they still will not 
contribute to enhanced financial stability unless 
an effective system of oversight and policy 
coordination is solidly in place. Though the design 
of new regulations is taking place through a process 
of thorough international coordination, oversight 
and implementation will be left to various national 
governments, whose efforts will be reinforced by 
international oversight provided by the Financial 
Stability	Board	(which	reports	to	the	G20).	Each	
country, however, will be responsible for creating its 
own system for macro-prudential oversight.
What does such a system require? First, a group 
of organizations, each knowledgeable about the 
various parts of a modern financial system and 
cognizant of the many linkages between these parts, 
needs to be assembled to monitor developments in 
the overall financial system. In addition, this group 
should examine how domestic real and financial 
markets are linked to markets in other countries. 
Then, after evaluating conditions domestically and 
abroad, the group should determine the appropriate 
time to implement countercyclical policies and the 
specific policies that are best suited to the situation. 
Since	a	range	of	countercyclical	tools	is	available,	
this determination should be based on a thorough 
analysis of the various macro-prudential tools  
and the tradeoffs among them. The group should 
also have both the authority and the political will  
to implement such policies in a timely and  
effective manner. 








has played the leading role in micro-prudential 
regulation and oversight. Through regular meetings 
of	the	Financial	Institution	Supervisory	Committee	
(FISC),	OSFI	is	brought	together	with,	and	receives	
advice from, the Bank of Canada, the Canada 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC), the 
federal Department of Finance, and the Financial 
Consumer Agency of Canada. In this way, various 
policy authorities from different parts of the 
Canadian financial system can share their views 
about important issues likely to affect the health 
of Canada’s financial institutions (Le Pan 2009). 
FISC’s	mandate,	however,	is	not	about	ensuring	
overall	financial	stability;	rather,	it	is	to	advise	OSFI	
about its central responsibility for micro-prudential 
regulation. Moreover, the various provincial 
securities regulators and Canada Mortgage and 
Housing	Corporation	(CMHC)	—	the	country’s	
largest provider of residential mortgage insurance 
—	are	not	regular	members	of	FISC.	Given	its	
specific mandate and representation, therefore, 
FISC	is	not	well	suited	to	be	the	central	body	
providing macro-prudential oversight and policy 
coordination; to ensure Canada’s future financial 
stability, some other institutional body is needed. 




discuss legislative and regulatory issues pertaining 
to the overall financial system. In recent years, 
SAC	has	successfully	addressed	some	issues	
pertaining to financial stability and has developed 
recommendations regarding changes in mortgage 
and mortgage insurance regulations; moreover, 




on which to build an effective body for oversight 
and policy coordination aimed at ensuring Canada’s 
financial	stability.	Before	SAC	can	perform	this	
role adequately, however, issues must be addressed 
relating to the committee’s mandate and 
responsibilities; its membership and formality; the 
appropriate knowledge and skills of committee 
members; and the committee’s appropriate leadership. 
First,	it	would	be	necessary	to	expand	SAC’s	
mandate to charge it explicitly with ensuring 
Canada’s overall financial stability, while having it 
continue in its current role of discussing legislative 
and regulatory issues pertaining to the financial 
sector, some of which would overlap with the 
objective	of	financial	stability.	Such	an	expanded	
mandate	would	require	SAC’s	being	given	the	
authority to make the policy decisions necessary 
to achieve its objective. It would also require that 
representatives	of	all	of	SAC’s	members	attend	
meetings and share pertinent information with the 
rest	of	the	committee	—	avoiding,	in	particular,	
any withholding of information as a result of 
interdepartmental rivalry. To make this work, it 
probably would be necessary to add matters of 
financial stability to the formal mandate of each 
SAC	member.	In	short,	if	SAC	is	to	be	successful	at	
providing effective macro-prudential oversight and 
policy coordination, it must be tasked specifically 
with this job, and its members must share the same 
objective and be prepared to participate in the 
process in good faith. 
Second,	SAC’s	current	informal	structure	and	
small	size	might	be	important	liabilities.	Since	
securities and housing markets played such major 
roles in the recent financial crisis, no body for 
providing macro-prudential oversight and policy 
5	 My	description	of	SAC	draws	on	several	conversations	with	current	and	former	senior	officials	at	Finance	Canada	and	the	
Bank of Canada.10
coordination is likely to be effective unless it 
includes CMHC and, if one is eventually created, a 
national securities regulator.6	Unlike	FISC,	which	
is a legislated committee whose formal minutes 
are sent to the minister of finance, who then can 
learn of any substantive disagreements among 
the	members,	SAC	is	a	less	formal	gathering	
of a smaller set of key decisionmakers. Making 
SAC	a	formal	legislated	committee	would	help	
establish responsibilities and accountability. 
Disagreements among its members, as well as its 
final policy recommendations, would be recorded 
in the minutes, a copy of which would be sent to 
the	minister	of	finance.	Such	a	process	would	lead	
individual	SAC	members	to	take	their	deliberations	
more seriously and help to ensure that important 
policy issues were discussed in a timely manner. In 
addition, formalizing the committee and process 
in this manner would increase the transparency of 
policymaking	and	increase	the	minister’s	—	and	
hence	the	federal	government’s	—	accountability	
for maintaining overall financial stability. As Laidler 
(1999) has noted, transparency and accountability 
are essential aspects of a coherent monetary order; 
there is no reason to think that they are any less 
important for macro-prudential oversight and 
policy coordination.
Third, it would be crucial for each member of 
any	newly	designed	SAC	to	be	able	to	discuss	and	
debate the many cross-cutting aspects of financial 
stability. Being specialists in their own financial 
market areas but lacking the ability to analyze and 
debate developments in other areas, committee 
members would be less able to identify possible 
problems and debate effective policy solutions. 




would be quite unequal for analyzing and debating 
developments in financial markets, the sustainability 
of certain financial patterns, and the costs and 
benefits of various policy actions. For example, the 
Bank of Canada’s ability to analyze key existing 
macro forces and the linkages between the various 
parts of the financial system is surely unmatched, 
while its detailed knowledge of developments in 
the housing market likely does not match that of 
CMHC, and its knowledge of financial institutions’ 
common exposures likely does not match that of 
OSFI.	Similarly,	while	each	of	CDIC,	OSFI,	and	
CMHC is presumably expert in its own domain, 
each knows far less about the domains of the other 
organizations. Accordingly, any expanded and 
formalized	SAC	should	ensure	that	each	of	its	
members has the human capital to allow balanced 
and fruitful discussions and debates to take place. 
Leadership and Final Authority
The final important issue pertaining to a newly 
designed	and	expanded	SAC	is	to	determine	the	
committee’s appropriate leadership. In particular, 
what should be the appropriate role played by 
6	 Several	reviewers	of	this	Commentary have noted that CMHC’s broad range of activities –– from providing mortgage 
insurance and creating mortgage-backed securities to developing housing policy and conducting housing research –– does 
not make it a natural member of a body devoted to the maintenance of financial stability. CMHC’s unusual combination 
of activities is reflected in its accountability structure: regulations on mortgages and mortgage insurance are made by 
the minister of finance, even though the minister of human resources and skills development is formally responsible 
for CMHC. While I am sympathetic to this view, I note that the scope of mortgage insurance makes it an important 
consideration for the stability of the overall financial system and that the terms of residential mortgages and mortgage 
insurance are potentially valuable macro-prudential tools. A possible solution would be to create a new organization that 
would take over CMHC’s financial activities and be under the responsibility of the finance minister, and to make this new 
organization	a	member	of	SAC.	A	smaller	and	non-financial	CMHC	responsible	for,	say,	social	housing	activities	could	
then continue to operate and be accountable to the minister of human resources and skills development.11 Commentary 338
the Bank of Canada, and would this involve 
expanding	its	existing	powers?	Should	the	governor	
of the Bank be in charge of macro-prudential 




along with the other members, while some other 
organization	plays	the	leading	role?	Or	is	there	
some intermediate position in which the Bank plays 
a genuine leadership role while leaving the final 
authority for decisions to some other party?
An interesting by-product of the half-century 
of relative financial stability that followed the 
Second	World	War	is	the	emphasis	central	banks	




policymakers alike came to view price stability as 
central	banks’	primary	—	and	sometimes	their	only	
—	task.	In	a	fascinating	recent	paper	describing	
the extent to which contemporary monetary 
policymakers have been ahead of the theoretical 
literature, Howitt (forthcoming) reminds us that 
many central banks were created largely out of the 
need to ensure financial stability, with concerns 
about inflation playing little or no role. The Bank 
of	England	came	to	prominence	when	a	lender	of	
last resort was needed during a series of financial 
panics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.	The	creation	of	the	US	Federal	Reserve	
in	1913	was	motivated	partly	by	the	financial	panic	
of 1907, which eventually was tamed through a 




combination of financial instability, economic 
depression, and unprecedented deflation were the 
challenges of the time. 
Respect	for	this	history	might	lead	some	to	
think it only natural that central banks be given 
the primary mandate for ensuring both financial 
stability and price stability, including control over 
the various macro-prudential policy tools. Yet the 
greater sophistication of financial markets and 
the associated regulations and regulatory bodies, 
combined with a greater appreciation for policy 
transparency and political accountability, makes 
policy setting today very different from that of a 
century or more ago when central banks first arrived 
on the scene. And these differences suggest to some 
that central banks should be intimately involved 
in	—	but	not	ultimately	responsible	for	—	macro-
prudential oversight and policy coordination.7
In the Canadian context, there is room for 
debate regarding the leadership of a newly designed 
and	expanded	SAC.	Some	argue	that	the	Bank	
of Canada should be given primary responsibility 
for ensuring financial stability (as well as price 
stability) including control over the full set of 
macro-prudential tools. With this responsibility, 
the governor of the Bank of Canada would be the 
obvious	choice	to	chair	the	newly	expanded	SAC,	
which would then effectively be an advisory body 
to the Bank. There is some compelling logic for 
this view. The Bank would have greater expertise on 
macroeconomics and financial stability than would 
any other member of the committee, and would 
be better placed to understand the relationships 
and tradeoffs between financial stability and 
price stability; as well, the coordination of macro-
prudential tools with more familiar monetary policy 
7	 See	European	Central	Bank	(2001)	for	a	brief	review	of	both	sides	of	this	argument	for	both	micro-prudential	and	
macro-prudential regulation and oversight. A more current discussion and review of evolving practises is found in Bank for 
International	Settlements	(2011).12
tools would be an important policy consideration.8 
In addition, if new macro-prudential regulations 
involved countercyclical indicators or thresholds, 
someone would need to determine when to pull 
the cyclical “trigger”; since the Bank controls 
the most important countercyclical tool in the 
government’s policy arsenal, it reasonably should 
take the lead in coordinating such policy decisions. 
Finally, the judicious use of macro-prudential tools 
sometimes would require policy actions that are 
politically unpopular in the short run but valuable 
in ensuring long-run financial stability. The wish to 
avoid this kind of political tension has led Canada 
and other countries to create central banks that are 
operationally independent; the same logic suggests 
that central banks could be given full responsibility 
for taking policy actions to ensure financial stability.
On	the	other	side	of	the	debate	are	those	who	
fear that an expansion of the Bank’s formal powers 
and responsibilities eventually would erode its 
valuable operational independence, with negative 
implications for the Bank’s ultimate ability to 
maintain price stability. Getting the Bank more 
closely involved in the regulation of financial 
institutions and financial markets, they argue, would 
risk exposing it to excessive political influence and 
threaten its independence, an asset that can be 
protected most effectively by keeping the Bank’s 
formal mandate as narrow as possible. 
A related concern involves placing control over 
various policy instruments in the hands of the Bank 
of Canada. For example, imagine a contentious 
discussion	within	a	newly	expanded	SAC	that	
involved changes to bank capital ratios or mortgage 
insurance or limits on loan-to-value ratios. It would 
be one thing for the Bank to argue strongly within 
SAC	that	financial	market	conditions	warranted	an	
increase in capital ratios or a reduction in maximum 
loan-to-value ratios, but quite another for the Bank 
to have the power to require that such changes be 
made, perhaps over the disagreement of other  
SAC	members.	
According to this view, the final say on such 
policy decisions should not rest with the Bank. The 
appropriate role for the Bank in macro-prudential 
oversight and regulation would then be simply 
as one member of the committee. All members 
of	SAC	would	have	their	mandates	expanded	
to include the maintenance of financial stability, 
and all would participate in regular discussions 
regarding oversight and the need to make policy 
adjustments. In this way, the Bank’s expertise would 
be	available	to	SAC	without	creating	an	undue	
expansion of its powers.
An intermediate option, which I support, 
would be for the Bank of Canada to take a clear 
leadership position in the operation of a reformed 
and	expanded	SAC	—	to	ensure	appropriate	issues	
are discussed in a timely manner and with adequate 
attention paid to the often subtle linkages between 
the	various	parts	of	the	financial	system	—	but	to	
leave the final authority for policy decisions to the 
minister of finance (see Crow 2009a). The Bank 
should also play a leading role in setting the agenda 
and in directing the overall discussion within 
the committee; it would then bring its analysis 
and perspective to the debates and have its views 
recorded in the official minutes to be reviewed by 
the minister. 
Who	should	chair	a	newly	designed	SAC?	The	
two obvious choices are the governor of the Bank 
of the Canada and the deputy minister of finance. 
The Bank’s expertise in matters of macroeconomics 
and financial markets and its narrower policy 
8	 While	the	Bank	may	have	unmatched	expertise	regarding	the	pro-cyclical	aspects	of	financial	stability,	and	how	they	relate	
to the use of macro-prudential tools, it is likely that expertise regarding the interconnectedness of financial institutions and 
their	common	exposures	to	shocks	is	most	concentrated	within	OSFI.	This	distinction,	and	the	separation	of	the	relevant	
expertise, underlines the collective nature of effective macro-prudential oversight. 13 Commentary 338
mandate suggest that the governor might be best 
placed to chair meetings, as this would ensure that 
the appropriate issues are discussed and debated in 
a timely manner. In contrast, the deputy minister 
of finance has a much wider policy mandate and 
manages a department that often needs to be 
steered carefully to avoid being drawn into the 
political agenda of the government of the day, and 
so might be unable to give the committee the close 
attention	it	deserved.	On	the	other	hand,	since	SAC	
would be discussing the use of a potentially large 
set of macro-prudential policy tools managed and 
overseen by several different government agencies, 
matters of political accountability and the need to 
protect the Bank’s independence suggest that the 
deputy minister might be the most appropriate 
chair after all. 
There is an inevitable tension here that must 
be accepted, and there is unlikely to be a perfect 
choice.	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	important	that	the	
Bank play a clear leadership role in driving the 
macro-prudential discussion and debate in a timely 
manner; on the other hand it is crucial to protect 
the Bank’s operational independence so as not 
to undermine its ability to deliver long-run price 
stability.	On	balance,	perhaps	the	best	solution	is		
for the governor and the deputy minister to chair 
the committee jointly and to pass the committee’s 
policy recommendations directly on to the minister 
of finance. The minister would then be ultimately 
accountable for the decisions taken, both to the 
government and, through Parliament, to the 
Canadian people. 
Final Remarks
Canada’s coherent monetary order has delivered 
considerable benefits for many years. What is now 
needed is to establish an equally coherent order for 
financial stability. For this task to be completed, 
however, there is still much work to do. Designing 
an institutional framework for macro-prudential 
oversight and policy coordination, and determining 
the Bank of Canada’s appropriate role within it, 
is not straightforward. It will require the federal 
government, first, to recognize the importance of 
the issue and, second, to take the necessary time 
to assemble the framework with the appropriate 
parties involved and to assign responsibilities 
clearly. Doing it right will involve bringing 
together various policy authorities with different 
perspectives, specialties, and primary mandates. 
Such	complexities,	however,	would	be	an	integral	
part of any structure devoted to taking a more 
systemic view of financial institutions and markets. 
The successful evolution of Canadian monetary 
policy is not just a reflection of the success or failure 
of random policy developments; rather, from the 
mid-1970s onward, policymakers at the Bank of 
Canada have sought continually to make genuine 
policy improvements, and these have resulted in 
Canada’s existing monetary coherence. For example, 
their search for a “nominal anchor” that would place 
limits on the behaviour of prices eventually led to 
the compelling notion of inflation targeting, an idea 
that clearly has succeeded.
In like manner, with regard to macro-prudential 
oversight, the federal government also needs to 
search continually for policy improvements, rather 
than	automatically	accept	the	status	quo.	Ottawa	
needs to examine whether the current institutional 
arrangements for oversight and policy coordination 
are adequate to prevent a crisis in the face of large 
future financial shocks. The prudent and responsible 
action on the federal government’s part is to ensure 
that the difficult questions are being asked, the 
genuine debates among the relevant parties are 
being resolved, and the necessary responsibilities are 
being assigned clearly.
Canada’s political leaders have accepted 
congratulations from around the world for the 
country’s sound financial system. Under the 
circumstances, it would be embarrassing indeed 
to discover that the system actually lacked the 
resilience to withstand a future crisis. No political 
price would have to be paid for quietly asking 
the right questions and making the appropriate 
institutional changes behind the scenes; an almost 14
unthinkable political price would be paid if the 
necessary reforms are not taken and a crisis 
occurred. Like purchasing insurance to protect 
against possible future costs, a straightforward 
approach to risk management should lead the 
federal government to devote the time and financial 
resources to ensure that Canada’s system of macro-
prudential oversight and policy coordination is as 
effective as possible.
The specific policy recommendations I have 
developed in this Commentary relate to the design 
of a more effective structure for macro-prudential 
oversight and policy coordination. They can be 
easily summarized:
1.  The maintenance of financial stability in Canada 
should be added to the mandate of the existing 
Senior	Advisory	Committee.	
2.	 SAC	should	become	a	legislated	committee	
whose formal minutes should be sent to the 
minister of finance. Its membership should be 
expanded to include the CMHC (or perhaps its 




enable them to understand more fully aspects  




governor of the Bank and the deputy minister  
of finance should co-chair the committee.
5.  The co-chairs should make clear policy 
recommendations directly to the minister of 
finance, who would be ultimately responsible for 
all policy decisions. 
A better system for macro-prudential oversight 
and policy coordination should not necessarily 
involve	“more”	government.	Rather,	it	should	be	
about ensuring that Canada’s underlying policies 
and policy frameworks allow financial markets to 
operate more or less on their own and to function 
well in the face of various kinds of shocks. If the 
policy framework and macro-prudential regulations 
work well, future shocks will be less likely to lead 
to economic crises –– and there will be less need 
for government to intervene in large and dramatic 
ways. In short, a better policy framework now might 
well permit “less” government later.
Economic	crises	naturally	make	government	
actions easier to justify. A particular policy initiative 
might or might not be a sensible response to an 
economic or financial crisis, but the mere existence 
of a crisis makes it far easier for a government to 
convince the people of the need for bold action. The 
unfortunate corollary, however, is that, when crises 
pass, it is all too easy for a government to move on 
to other things, secure in the belief that there is no 
further need for serious policy changes, even though 
the problems that led to the crisis might still lurk 
beneath the surface. 
That Canada’s financial system has fared far 
better over the past few years than have those of 
the	United	States	or	the	United	Kingdom	could	
indicate that this country has no serious policy 
challenges to solve within the financial sector; it 
could	also	simply	reflect	Canada’s	good	luck	—	or	
perhaps it is a bit of both. In any event, the federal 
government would be prudent to hope for the best 
while planning for the worst, and to view existing 
challenges as an opportunity to design a policy 
framework that is sufficiently resilient to meet the 
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